Security Architecture
Security Model
Section titled “Security Model”The Code Signing platform enforces a layered security model based on:
- Trust boundary isolation
- Least-privilege access
- Strong authentication
- Auditable operations
Trust Boundaries
Section titled “Trust Boundaries”Key trust boundaries include:
- External systems → Code Signing API
- Signing Engine → Key Management Layer
- Administrative access → Policy store
A compromise in one boundary does not imply compromise of signing keys.
Key Protection
Section titled “Key Protection”- Private keys are stored in protected key stores
- Keys are never exported in plaintext
- Cryptographic operations occur within trusted boundaries
- Access to keys is tightly controlled and logged
Authentication and Authorization
Section titled “Authentication and Authorization”- CI/CD systems authenticate using scoped credentials
- Administrative actions require elevated privileges
- Signing and administration are strictly separated
Audit and Compliance
Section titled “Audit and Compliance”- All signing operations are logged
- Policy changes are auditable
- Logs can be integrated with enterprise SIEM systems
- Audit data supports forensic and compliance requirements
Operational Best Practices
Section titled “Operational Best Practices”This page summarizes pragmatic security controls and operational practices to protect code signing processes, keys, and artifacts.
Core principles
Section titled “Core principles”- Least privilege — grant only the minimal access required for human and machine identities.
- Separation of duties — administrative privileges are not signing privileges; use approval/quorum workflows for production signings.
- Key custody — keep private keys inside HSMs or managed KMS; avoid exporting private key material.
- Immutable auditing — every signing action must be logged and tamper-evident.
- Secure supply chain — ensure reproducible builds, SBOMs, and signed provenance attestation.
HSM and Key Management
Section titled “HSM and Key Management”- Keep signing keys inside FIPS‑validated HSMs (or managed KMS with equivalent guarantees).
- Generate keys inside the HSM when possible; restrict key usage to signing only and set object attributes accordingly.
- Use PKCS#11 / vendor APIs and enforce access controls (PINs, roles, ACLs).
- Plan and test key rotation and vendor-supported backup/recovery procedures.
Identity & Access Management
Section titled “Identity & Access Management”- Use short-lived credentials for CI/CD (OIDC preferred) and rotate credentials frequently.
- Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and group-based approver lists for quorum signing flows.
- Require multi-factor authentication for admin actions and protect approval UIs behind SSO.
Network & Infrastructure Security
Section titled “Network & Infrastructure Security”- Place HSMs on management-only networks with strict firewall rules.
- Use mTLS for service-to-service communication and for agent proxies.
- Protect public ingress with WAF rules and DDoS mitigation where public endpoints exist.
Build & CI/CD Best Practices
Section titled “Build & CI/CD Best Practices”- Prefer digest-based signing (sign artifact digest) to avoid signing unverified build outputs.
- Use reproducible builds when possible. Record and sign build provenance (commit, builder, environment).
- Use ephemeral ephemeral build runners or short-lived agents; do not store secrets in images or long-lived runners.
- Gate production signing behind approvals and automated policy checks (artifact provenance, SBOM, vulnerability thresholds).
Logging, Monitoring & Incident Response
Section titled “Logging, Monitoring & Incident Response”- Emit structured, immutable audit logs: who requested signing, which key was used, policy applied, timestamp token included.
- Export logs to a central SIEM and set alerts on unusual signing activity, HSM failures, or queue spikes.
- Define an incident playbook for key compromise, including suspension of key usage, incident notification, and re-issuance.
Hardening & Configuration
Section titled “Hardening & Configuration”- Keep platform components up to date; subscribe to vendor security advisories.
- Enforce secure TLS configurations (modern cipher suites, HTTP Strict Transport Security).
- Limit runtimes to least-privilege users, disable interactive access on production worker nodes.
- Regularly scan images/containers for vulnerabilities and enforce runtime policies.
Checklist (Operational)
Section titled “Checklist (Operational)”- Keys generated in HSM/KMS and protected by ACLs
- RBAC and quorum approvals configured for production signing
- CI/CD uses short‑lived credentials and verifiable provenance
- Audit logs forwarded to SIEM and retention policy defined
- Health checks and alerts for HSM connectivity and signing queues
- Key rotation and recovery procedures tested